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Abstract: Traffic accidents impose large costs, with 1,291 road deaths in Australia in 2011. 
The total costs of road accidents were estimated to be $17 billion in 2003, equivalent to 2.3 
per cent of that year’s GDP, averaging around 8.4 cents per vehicle kilometre. The 
Productivity Commission has recommended replacing tort law with a compulsory, 
government run first party insurance scheme, where all victims receive compensation from 
the state, regardless of fault. The proposal is being implemented across Australia, NSW has 
adopted it this year. Contrary to the PC’s assertions, the evidence is that no fault insurance 
would increase traffic fatalities by 10-30 per cent and accidents by even more. This has 
implications for the safety design of road infrastructure. An inter-disciplinary approach is 
taken, in this paper, combining, law, economics and transportation engineering to examine 
the interaction of legal rules, insurance arrangements, economic incentives and physical 
infrastructure. 
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I. Introduction 
In its 2011 “Disability Care and Support” report, the Productivity Commission recommended 
replacing the current State based disability support schemes with a National Disability Insurance 
Scheme (NDIS). With attention focused on this plan for multi-billion dollar increases in 
spending on disability support, and its financing, receiving less scrutiny is the other 
recommendation in the Productivity Commission’s report, that: 
 
State and territory governments should create insurance schemes that would provide fully-
funded care and support for all catastrophic injuries on a no-fault basis, and that would 
collectively constitute a National Injury Insurance Scheme (NIIS). 
The NIIS would include all medical treatment, rehabilitation, home and vehicle modifications 
and care costs, and cover catastrophic injuries from motor vehicle, medical (excluding cases 
of cerebral palsy associated with pregnancy or birth, which would be covered by the NDIS), 
criminal and general accidents. Common law rights to sue for long-term care and support 





The Productivity Commission recommended all states create no-fault motor accident 
insurance schemes by 2013 and other forms of catastrophic injury be covered by 2015 and an 
inquiry be held in 2020 to examine widening coverage to damage for pecuniary and economic 
loss and to some non-catastrophic injuries.1  
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Currently the Northern Territory, NSW, Victoria and Tasmania have no fault insurance 
schemes for motor vehicle accidents, the other states have fault based tort law liability, where an 
accident victim can only claim from a negligent injurer (who usually carries compulsory third 
party insurance).1 The Productivity Commission’s NIIS proposal involves major changes for all.  
Except for the Northern Territory (which abolished common law rights to sue for transport 
accidents), the current no fault schemes are ‘add-ons’, with limited no-fault benefits. They 
preserve the right to sue for damages under tort law and apply only to motor vehicle accidents. 
Some require a threshold level of damage to sue under common law; others do not restrict access 
to tort actions.2  
 
The States have agreed to introduce no-fault lifetime care and support for people who are 
catastrophically injured in motor vehicle accidents prior to the commencement of the NDIS 
launch.3 NSW and South Australia have announced plans to convert their compulsory third party 
car insurance arrangements, where drivers must insure against the risk of being held legally 
liable to another (the ‘third party’), into no-fault schemes – where the driver and all victims 
claim from the scheme regardless of fault. It includes, therefore, compulsory first party 
insurance, where the policy holder (the first party) is insured against the risk of suffering loss. 
The Productivity Commission estimates the NIIS would have cost an extra $830 million a year in 
2011– to be raised from increasing compulsory third party insurance premiums for motor 
vehicles, medical indemnity premiums, surcharges on rail passengers, levies on boats, increased 
municipal rates and from general revenue.1 The Productivity Commission’s proposal replaces 
legal liability with a compulsory, government run first party insurance scheme. The Productivity 
Commission asserts: 
 
Nor is there evidence that the common law right to sue for compensation for care costs 
increases incentives for prudent behaviour by drivers, doctors and other parties.”1 
 
This statement ignores and contradicts the vast theoretical and empirical law and economics 
literature on the very issues examined in the Commission’s report: the effect of tort law and 
different liability arrangements, insurance, litigation costs, settlement, and no‐fault insurance 
schemes. The Commission’s proposal runs the risk of a large increase in accident costs, which 
can involve substantial negative externalities. A negative externality is an uncompensated net 
cost imposed by one agent on another without permission. If some of an action’s costs are born 
by other people, then it may be taken even if the social costs are greater than the benefits. As a 
result external costs may be incurred even if they are not worth incurring. The economic analysis 
of how tort liability controls harmful externalities is one of the great accomplishments of law and 
economics. It has moved the central focus of tort law towards how best to induce strangers to 
take account of the full social costs of their actions and undertake optimal precautions (see 
Shavell4; and Landes and Foster5).  
 
II. The Law and Economics Analysis of Accidents 
 
The economic analysis of accidents starts with the observation that they are not entirely 
accidental. People do not choose to have accidents, but they can take precautions to reduce the 
probability and severity of accidents. For example, a motorist chooses what kind of car to drive, 
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how often and what speed to drive it, how often to have its brakes checked, how much to drink 
before driving and so on. These decisions and many more, affect the cost the motorist imposes 
on other people. 
 
The law and economics approach further observes that accidents are jointly determined by the 
actions of all parties involved. The problem is not just to control the injurer’s behavior, the 
victim’s actions also affect the probability and magnitude of harm. That is, it uses the model of 
bilateral precaution. Harm from accidents is probabilistic – whether an accident will occur is 
uncertain, and the probability of an accident occurring depends on the care or precautions taken 
by all parties involved. For example, let L be expected accident losses (for the moment, think of it 
as being per kilometer and the number of kilometers driven or walked is fixed). The injurer can 
take a level of care X at a constant marginal cost of CI per unit and the victim can take a level of 
care Y at CV per unit.  
 
Then L = L(X, Y), ∂L/ ∂X < 0, ∂L/ ∂Y < 0, ∂2L/ ∂X2 > 0, ∂2L/ ∂Y2 > 0. It will be assumed that 
∂
2L/ ∂X∂Y > 0 (X and Y are substitutes). The efficient outcome minimises the total social costs of 
accidents: the costs of prevention, the costs of injuries that nonetheless occur, the costs of 
administration (such as litigation costs) and the costs of risk bearing. To achieve efficiency, 
parties should take all cost justified precautions – those precautions that save more in accident 
losses than the precaution costs. Ignoring litigation and risk bearing costs for now, the efficient 
outcome minimizes  
WXX+ WYY + L(X, Y)       (1) 
At the efficient levels of care X*, Y* the necessary first order conditions are  
WX = − ∂L(X*, Y*)/ ∂X ; WY = − ∂L(X*,Y*)/ ∂Y = 0.
b   (2) 
 
It is natural to ask: what set of legal rules will lead the parties to make efficient decisions. It is 
a complex problem. As the first order conditions show, the optimal level of care by each party 
depends on the care taken by the other party, and the decisions are taken independently and in 
advance of the parties’ interaction. A decision maker has the incentive to make efficient 
decisions when faced with the full social cost of his actions, including the cost imposed on 
others. Then he would undertake actions only if their benefits exceed the social cost. In the 
jargon, to achieve efficiency we need to internalise the externalities.  
 
III. The Role of Tort Law 
 
Australia is a common law country, inheriting the body of judge made law built up in England 
over the centuries. The common law is by far the dominant source of the legal rules that govern 
the interactions between citizens. Victims enforce the common law and it creates incentives 
through injurers having to compensate their victims. Tort law deals with externalities between 
strangers – interactions outside a contractual relationship. A tort is a civil wrong: where one 
party inflicts damage on another, other than from breach of contract. Contract law deals with 
breaches of contract, which raises different issues – as the parties can negotiate before the 
accident and adjust the contract price – and is relevant for medical malpractice and workplace 
accidents.  
                                                          
b The above assumptions about the derivatives of the L(X, Y) function ensure the second-order conditions 
are met.  
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One way of inducing people to take appropriate precautions is to make them liable for the cost 
of the damage they do to others if they don’t – by allowing their victims to sue them for 
damages. That is, tort damages are a way of forcing people to take account of the costs they 
impose on others. If a party imposes costs on someone else, is sued and held liable – then he 
must make the victim ‘whole’. That is, pay the victim damages, a sum of money that 
compensates for the damage imposed, transferring the cost back to the person responsible – 
internalizing the externality to bring private costs in line with social costs. 
 
The main basis for liability for damage from accidents is the tort of negligence. Developed in 
the nineteenth century, it became important after the invention of the railway, and later the motor 
car. It imposes a duty to take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure another. Victims must also behave reasonably and 
take reasonable care – or they will be held to have contributed to the accident and be guilty of 
contributory negligence. Under the common law, contributory negligence was a defense – the 
defendant was not liable if the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. In Australia, statute has 
modified the common law so that a negligent injurer is only partially liable if the victim is also 
negligent. Contributory negligence reduces the damages paid by the proportion the defendants 
conduct contributed to the accident – what economists call comparative negligence. For example, 
if the plaintiff is considered 40 per cent responsible for the accident, damages are reduced by 40 
per cent. 
 
IV. How the Rule of Negligence Can Result In Optimal Outcomes 
 
If the courts set the required standard of due care for each party at the efficient level, the 
efficient outcome can result. The courts look at the conduct of the defendant and the claimant 
relative to the norm of the ‘reasonable person’ to determine whether the defendant should bear 
the loss, which in practice requires judges to compare the cost of a precaution against its benefit. 
A reasonable person is obliged to take precautions that are cheap and eliminate a substantial risk, 
but not expensive precautions against a remote risk. Further, the adversarial nature of common 
law adjudication encourages the courts to think in terms of incremental changes, focusing on the 
behavior of the parties. Each party tries to persuade the judge the other party did not act with 
reasonable care by setting out actions the other party could have taken to avoid the accident. The 
party accused of negligence counters with reasons why this would not have reduced the 
likelihood of harm or would have been impractical, too expensive and unreasonable. The court 
process encourages courts to require only cost justified precautions. 
 
The prospect of being found negligent gives all parties a strong incentive to reach the standard 
of due care. The following simple model shows how tort can solve the bilateral care problem and 
result in efficient outcomes. As each party’s action affects the results of other parties’ actions, 
and each makes their decision independently, game theory is the obvious way to model the 
effects of the law. Consider an accident between an injurer and a victim. Assume: 
 
• Unilateral damage – only the victim suffers damage (think of a car running down a 
pedestrian). 
• Risk neutrality. 
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• Two levels of care: due care (not liable) or no care (negligent and liable). 
• Damages fully compensate victims for their injuries. 
• No mistakes. Courts set due care at the efficient level, observe actual care taken and each 
party knows the required care. 
• Fixed number of trips by each party. 
 
Each of these assumptions will be relaxed later in the paper. The payoffs from the care 
decisions each party must make are set out in the non-cooperative game between two parties 
summarized in Table 1 (player 1’s payoffs are first in each cell). The individual strategies are 
investment of resources in preventing accidents. Expected accident costs (higher is worse) are L 
(i, j) where i is the motorists action and j is the pedestrian’s action. The cost of taking care for the 
injurer and victim is CI and CV. Lack of care increases expected accident costs: L(D, D) < 
L(D,N), L(N, D) < L(N, N).. If due care levels are set efficiently, the due level of care reduces 
accident costs by more than the costs of the care (total accident costs fall when take due care) 
and so: CV + L(D, D) < L(D, N), CI + L(D, D) < L(N, D), CI + L(D, N) < L(N, N) and CV + L(N, 
D) < L(N, N). Combining these gives CI + CV + L (D, D) < L (N, N). 
 
Table 1. Negligence game. 
 
The motorist is liable if he is negligent. If both the motorist and pedestrian are negligent, the 
pedestrian bears a portion b of costs, and the motorist (1 – b). b depends on the legal rule in 
force. Under pure negligence, the injurer is always liable if negligent and b = 0. The traditional 
common law rule where contributory negligence is a defense, b = 1. Under comparative 
negligence, b is the share of the victims blame for the accident. Each party chooses the action 
that maximizes his benefits net of expected liability. As due care is set at the efficient level, a 
party that expects the other to take due care will take due care. If the pedestrian takes due care 
and the motorist does not, the motorist will be found negligent and bear all the accident costs. He 
has a big incentive to take due care and avoid these costs. If the motorist is expected to take due 
care, the victim bears all the accident costs and has an incentive to minimize them and take all 
cost justified precautions. 
 
Player 1: 
Motorist (injurer)  
Due care  CI  
L(D, N) 
CI  
CV+ L(D, D)  
No care  (1 – b)L(N, N) 
bL(N, N)  
L(N, D) 
CV  
  No care  Due care  
  Player 2: Pedestrian (victim)  
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If CI < (1 – b)L(N, N) the motorist has a dominant strategy to take care and the Nash 
equilibrium outcome is D,D the social optimum where both parties take the efficient level of 
care. The motorist always takes care, and that induces the pedestrian to take the efficient level of 
care. For example, this would occur under pure negligence, where b = 0. The incentive not to be 
found negligent and liable gives the injurer an incentive to meet the court determined standard of 
due care. If the injurer takes due care, the accident costs are borne by the victim, who then has 
the incentive to take an efficient level of care. 
 
If CV < bL (N, N) then the pedestrian has the dominant strategy to take care and the outcome 
is D, D. For example, this would occur when comparative negligence is a defense. 
At least one of those outcomes must be true as: 
 CI + CV + L (D, D) < L (N, N) = (1 – b) L (N, N) + bL (N, N)   (3) 
 
So, at least one party has the dominant strategy to take care. The other party expects this and 
so will take the efficient level of care. Each party has the duty to behave reasonably, but also the 
right to act on the presumption that others are behaving reasonably. The tort of negligence gives 
double responsibility at the margin. When the other takes care, each party faces the full social 
cost of harm up to the required standard of care. The analysis generalises to continuous, rather 
than two levels, of care. If due care is set at the efficient level, the efficient outcome results.  
 
V. The Role Of Insurance 
 
Analyzing the effect of insurance requires us to drop the assumption of risk aversion, so that 
there is a cost to bearing risk and a demand for insurance. For example, in the equilibrium in the 
simple model of negligence, there is no negligence and no damages paid – so the victims bear the 
remaining accident costs. That creates a demand for first party insurance. Tort law is bad at 
providing insurance and compensation, with poor coverage (it covers only a small sub-set of 
losses: where there is a negligent party to sue) and high legal costs. The accident problem 
involves not only the goal of appropriately reducing the risks of accidents but also allocating and 
spreading the risks of losses from accidents that do occur – protecting risk averse people against 
risk. Rrisk aversion increases the incentive to meet the standard and can lead to excessive care in 
the absence of insurance (when care is continuous). 
 
The first best outcome would be for all parties to take the efficient amount of care and for 
risks to be fully insured and spread; but if an insurance policy completely eliminates risk, it may 
have an undesirable side effect. It removes the incentive for the insured to take care to reduce the 
risk of the accident occurring, the so-called moral hazard problem.  
 
If the insurance company can observe the care taken, it can overcome the moral hazard 
problem by adjusting the premium to reflect the increase in the expected loss resulting from the 
insured person’s taking less care. When care is not observable by the insurance company, 
insurance is imperfect and the individual cannot reduce his premium by taking more care, 
reducing the incentive to take care. If there is moral hazard, the insured takes no care and the 
probability of the accident increases – this raises the premium. In equilibrium the insurance 
policy must break even on the care chosen when it is accepted. This may result in the person not 
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insuring at all – if the moral hazard effect of increased premiums outweighs the risk spreading 
benefits. 
 
What is usually done is to provide partial insurance coverage, such as co-insurance or 
deductibles or premium increases after claims, in order to induce the insured person to take some 
precautions – trading off increased care against increased risk bearing. Often governments 
regulate to prevent insurance companies from doing so. For example, compulsory third party 
insurance in Australia tends to be uniform with no risk rating or use of co-insurance and 
deductibles. 
 
VI.  The Effect of No-Fault Insurance 
 
The effect of no-fault insurance is illustrated with the game in Table 2. It keeps the 
assumptions listed above (such as full insurance), except for risk neutrality. The motorist pays 
the same premium P whether he takes care or not, so has no incentive to take costly care. The 
pedestrian is fully compensated whether he takes care or not, and so has no incentive to take 
care. All parties have a dominant strategy not to take care. The Nash equilibrium is that neither 
party takes care, the worst outcome. Accident costs are higher when no-one takes care (L (N, N) 
> L (D, D)) the premium reflects the crash costs when no-one takes care, L (N, N). Compared 
with the outcome in Table 1, drivers are worse off (they now pay a premium that reflects high 
accident costs) and pedestrians better off (they are now fully insured).  
 




There is a trade-off between increased accident costs and better compensation and risk 
spreading. But pedestrians always had the option of taking out first party insurance. If they chose 
not to because the moral hazard effect increased premiums too much, then it is inefficient to 




Motorist (injurer)  
Due care  CI + P 
0  
CI + P 
CV  




  No care  Due care  
  Player 2: Pedestrian (victim)  
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VII. Compulsory Third Party Insurance 
 
In the simple model of Table 1, there is no demand for third party liability insurance because 
motorists have the incentive to take care; they are not negligent, and not liable. Drivers may be 
found negligent because of mistakes – they may actually be negligent because they make 
mistakes in the level of care taken (such as a lapse in concentration) or courts may make errors in 
assessing the actual care taken and wrongly find an injurer negligent, or the driver may gamble 
on the court thinking he was not negligent when he really was, and lose. 
 
 If care is continuous, court errors tend to encourage parties to take more care, greater than the 
optimal level, especially if they are risk averse. The higher the level of precautions taken, the 
smaller the chance of being wrongly found negligent. Risk-bearing is relevant for two reasons: 
not only because potential victims may face the risk of accident losses, but also because potential 
injurers may face the risk of liability. The chance of being found liable because of errors by the 
court or own mistakes creates a demand for third party insurance. Voluntary third party 
insurance tends to be efficient, even if it is imperfect and reduces care.  
 
There is a trade-off between risk spreading and care – greater risk spreading reduces 
incentives for care and increases accident costs. But if victims are fully compensated, that cost is 
internalised in the price of the insurance, which reflects care taken under the policy, and third 
parties are fully compensated for increase in accidents. Insurance is a voluntary transaction and 
so it will take place only if both parties believe the gain balances the loss. If individuals choose 
to purchase insurance, they reveal that the risk spreading benefits outweigh the extra accident 
costs. If victims are not fully compensated, then they bear some of the extra accident costs and it 
cannot be guaranteed liability insurance is desirable. Further, if liability insurance is compulsory 
(as it is in Australia), it cannot be guaranteed that the risk spreading benefits outweigh the extra 
accident costs. 
 
The Productivity Commission recognizes that no-fault insurance reduces incentives to take 
care, but it claims that: 
 
in the presence of insurance, especially with little focus on risk‐rating for some causes of 




and that no‐fault insurance would  
 
currently perform no worse at deterring excessively risky behavior, as despite the appearance 
of the common law, it is the insurer that pays.
1 
 
That is, the Productivity Commission claims that current compulsory third party insurance 
removes any incentives for care, so that replacing the current system with no-fault insurance 
would not increase accidents. But the Productivity Commission ignores a fundamental 
contribution of the law and economics literature: the model of bilateral care and the importance 
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of victim care. The chance of an accident depends on the actions of both the injurer and victim. 
Even if we assume full, imperfect compulsory third party insurance, with no risk rating or use of 
co-insurance and deductibles, and that moral hazard means the insured takes no care at all, tort 
law still affects the victim’s incentive. If the injurer is negligent, the victim may claim 
compensation from the insurer of the owner/driver of the 'at-fault' vehicle. But if the victim is 
also at fault, the compensation may be reduced under comparative negligence, providing an 
incentive for the victim to meet the standard of due care set by the courts, in order to preserve his 
right to damages. Table 3 illustrates. 
 




The motorist pays the premium P whether he takes care or not, and so has a dominant strategy 
to take no care. The pedestrian takes care if CV < bL (N, N). As the standard of care is set 
efficiently, CV + L (N, D) < L (N, N), and so the pedestrian may meet the standard and take care. 
If b = 1, as under the common law defence of contributory negligence, then the victim has an 
incentive to meet the standard of care. Given compulsory third party insurance, the movement 
from contributory to comparative negligence has a large potential cost, it may reduce victim care, 
moving the equilibrium from N, D to N, N, increasing expected accident costs from L(N, D) to 
L(N, N). Moving to no-fault insurance removes the victim’s incentive to take care, increasing 
accidents.   
 
More generally, if care is continuous, the victim may have an incentive to take due care under 
compulsory third party insurance, but if not, he still has an incentive to take some care – more 
than under no-fault insurance. Victims’ care is particularly important in motor vehicle accidents, 
where a substantial portion of accidents involve motor vehicles crashing into each other (bilateral 
damage). In 2010, multi-vehicle crashes were 42 per cent of Australian fatal road traffic 
accidents.6 Drivers cannot be sure in advance whether they will be an injurer or a victim. Even 
with compulsory third party insurance, tort law gives drivers an incentive to be careful in their 
role as victims – so their damages are not reduced through comparative negligence.  
 
Dropping the assumption of unilateral damage means that tort law gives drivers an incentive 
to take care even with imperfect compulsory third party insurance. In fact, in the bilateral 
Player 1: 
Motorist (injurer)  
Due care  CI + P 
L(D, N)  
CI + P 
CV + L(D, D) 
No care  P 
bL(N, N)  
P  
CV  
  No care  Due care  
  Player 2: Pedestrian (victim)  
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damage case, both drivers may have an incentive to meet the standard of due care and the 
optimal outcome is reached. Again, the common law rule of contributory negligence as a defence 
would ensure the worst N, N outcome, where no-one takes care, is avoided – but it is a 
possibility under comparative negligence. More generally, some drivers may not have an 
incentive to meet the standard, but with continuous care they would take more care than under no 
fault insurance.  
 
The Productivity Commission argues that no-fault insurance will not increase accidents 
because injurers with third party liability insurance currently have no incentive to take care. But 
it proposes to extend no-fault insurance to cover all general accidents, such as household 
accidents, even where injurers do have compulsory third party liability insurance, reducing 
incentives for injurer and victim care. Moreover, self-inflicted accidents would be covered – 
such as falling off ladders or single vehicle accidents, which were 44 per cent of fatal road traffic 
accidents in Australia in 2010,6 although some of the deaths are passengers. When no other 
person contributes to, or is involved in, the accident, the costs of these accidents tend to be 
internalised and efficient levels of accident prevention adopted (the victim and injurer are the 
same person). Furthermore, people can choose to take out first party insurance and internalize the 
resulting moral hazard costs. Introducing compulsory no fault insurance for general accidents, 
financed through municipal rates, will externalise costs to taxpayers, reducing the incentives for 
care.  
 
VIII. Dropping the Other Assumptions 
 
If courts do not calculate optimal care correctly they will set the standard above or below the 
efficient level. The parties may or may not meet the standard of due care. If they meet the 
standard, the tort system encourages them to take some care. If they do not meet the standard, 
they will be liable, will bear accident costs and have the incentive to take some care.  In both 
cases, tort law gives more care than no fault insurance. Victims have a greater incentive to take 
care when damages only partially compensate them, so that they bear some accident costs. They 
are more likely to meet the due care standard (and perhaps even exceed it) and will take some 
care even under a no-fault scheme. But a no-fault scheme reduces the costs that negligent victims 
bear, and reduces the incentive to take care relative to tort law with compulsory third party 
insurance. Injurers have no incentive to take care under either. 
 
A further law and economics insight that the Productivity Commission ignore is the incentive 
legal and insurance arrangements give for excessive activity levels. Only observable precautions 
can be made part of the court’s standard of due care, and the prospect of being found negligent 
does not encourage parties to take cost-justified precautions that the court cannot observe. The 
activity level is extent of participation in the activity that is the source of the accident, such as 
kilometres driven. Usually courts do not include the activity level in the required standard of 
care, either because they cannot observe it or cannot judge whether is excessive. The court can 
judge whether the driver was negligent in how he drove but not whether he was negligent in how 
much he drove--whether his marginal trip was worth taking, given the expected accident costs it 
produced.  
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Expected accident losses depend not only on the care exercised by each party but also on each 
party’s activity level. For example, the number of car accidents depends on how many kilometres 
are driven. Under a negligence rule, drivers drive too much, since having taken the efficient level 
of precaution they are no longer liable for damages. Injurers do not bear the full social costs of 
their activity, but impose an external cost on accident victims, who bear their accident costs. 
Injurers only consider their net benefits from extra participation in the activity but not the 
increase in expected victim accident costs, resulting in excessive activity levels. Under 
compulsory third party insurance, accident costs that result from negligence are externalised onto 
the insurance company. But the premium charged to drivers will reflect this cost – internalising 
this cost for the participation decision (whether to drive at all), which may deter some from 
becoming drivers (such as young high risk drivers). But as insurance premiums are some fixed 
annual amount and do not vary with kilometres driven, if the driver chooses to participate, there 
is still an incentive for excessive activity levels (i.e. to drive too many kilometres), with accident 
costs externalised across premiums for all drivers. If damages under-compensate accident 
victims, then they bear some of the external cost as well. 
 
The per kilometre accident externality is significant. Connelly and Supangan7 estimated the 
total costs of road traffic crashes in Australia as $17 billion in 2003, equivalent to 2.3 per cent of 
that year’s GDP. Motor vehicles in Australia travelled an estimated 201,497 million kilometres 
in the 12 months ended 31 October 2003,8 so accident costs averaged around 8.4 cents per 
vehicle kilometre. No fault insurance exacerbates the activity level externality. It increases the 
accident externality per kilometre through reducing care and covers a greater portion of victim 
accident costs (externalising more accident costs) – both effects reducing the private cost per 
kilometre driven (and walked), increasing activity levels. The Productivity Commission do not 
consider this externality or policies to combat it, such as per kilometre insurance premiums.  
 
IX. The Likely Effects of No Fault Insurance 
 
No-fault insurance will, therefore, increase accidents, even when replacing tort liability 
combined with imperfect, non-risk rated compulsory third party insurance. No fault insurance 
increases the accident rate per kilometre and kilometres driven, increasing external accident 
costs. The Productivity Commission point to the large litigation costs associated with tort law, 
but the litigation costs may be worth bearing if they cause enough efficient deterrence. The issue 
is which system is socially most efficient given overall costs and benefits, which include 
administrative and legal costs. The increase in accidents depends on the importance of victim’s 
care and its response to changes in incentives. Exactly how much deterrence tort law provides 
and the extent to which replacing the negligence rule with no fault insurance will increase 
accident costs through reducing care and increasing activity levels is an empirical issue. 
 
The literature finds tort liability provides a significant amount of deterrence, especially for 
automobile accidents (see, for example, the summaries in Schwartz9, Dewees et al10; van 
Velthoven11; Sloan and Chepke12; and Liao and White13). Not the least is the evidence on no-
fault insurance. The studies on no fault insurance usually examine the effect of a shift to no-fault 
insurance on motor vehicle accident deaths, despite many no-fault schemes leaving tort liability 
intact in death cases. The justification is the probabilistic nature of accidents – less care means 
more accidents and some fraction will be fatal.14 The results differ greatly – some finding 
shifting to no-fault in various states in the U.S. had no effect, others finding a 15 per cent 
increase in deaths. That is to be expected, as the switch to no fault involves changes in liability 
rules and in insurance arrangements. The effect of introducing no
system before it was introduced (such as liability insurance arrangeme
scheme introduced. For example, many schemes (as in NSW and Victoria) retain large elements 
of tort law and provide relatively modest no
schemes exclude damages for pain and sufferi
increases victim care).  
 
The most relevant studies for the NIIS proposal examine the effects of a shift to a pure no 
fault scheme that abolishes tort liability, as in New Zealand or for motor vehicles in Quebec a
the Northern Territory. Swan and McEwin
fault in New Zealand and the Northern Territory, compared to other states of Australia and find it 
to be associated with a substantial increase of 16 to 20 perce
Quebec, fatalities increased 3 – 9 per cent (see for example, van Velthoven
Hause finds little initial effect of the NZ scheme on overall fatality rates, but a modest long run 
trend effect in increasing fatal accident rates over what they otherwise would have been.
Clearly there is a trade-off that the 
compensate victims better, but is likely to increase accident costs. It is a difficult policy issue 
what are the equity effects of helping those with catastrophic injuries, but creating more people 




The prospect of substantial increases in traffic accidents 
of road infrastructure, increasing
(H, Z) where Z is dangerous driving (a fall in driver care and increase in kilometres driven 
increases Z) and H is investment in road infrastructure, where 
> 0. If H costs W per unit, then if we choose H to minimise 
condition for the optimal level of H, which minimises accident plus infrastructure costs, 
(H, Z) + W = 0. 
 
Figure 1. Optimal highway investment.
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-fault insurance depends on the 
nts) and the details of the 
-liability benefits. For example, many no fault 
ng, and so under-compensate victims (which 
15,16 present empirical evidence on the switch to no
nt in the number of road fatalities. In 
 and Dewees et al
Productivity Commission ignores. No fault insurance may 
-off doesn’t exist.  
for Highway Expenditure 
has implications for the safety
 the optimal amount of investment. If accident costs
∂A/∂H = AH < 0 and 











 are A = A 
∂A/∂Z = AZ 
-order 
is AH 
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The introduction of no-fault insurance would increase Z. If AZH < 0 then an increase in Z from 
the introduction of no fault insurance will make AH more negative and increase the optimal 
amount of H (H and Z are substitutes). If Z is endogenous, then the rise in H will further increase 
Z, which increases H further.  
 
An increase in Z from Z0 to Z1 from the introduction of no-fault insurance shifts the A (H, Z) 
curve up (from the blue to the green curves) and makes it steeper if AZH<0. This raises the 
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